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Abstract
We study transactions in which sellers fears being underpaid because
their outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize various
observed contracts as solutions to such smart buyer problems. Key to these
solutions is granting the seller upside participation. In contrast, the lemons
problem calls for granting the buyer downside protection. But, in either case,
the seller (buyer) receives a convex (concave) claim. Thus, contracts usually
associated with the lemons problem, such as debt or cash-equity offers, can
be equally well manifestations of the smart buyer problem, although the two
information asymmetries have opposite cross-sectional implications. (JEL
D82, D86)
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A commonly made assumption is that sellers are better than potential buyers
at evaluating an asset. In this paper, we study bilateral transactions under the
opposite assumption that the potential buyer of the asset is better informed about
the seller’s outside option. We refer to these situations as “smart buyer problems.”
As an example, imagine an inexperienced start-up founder who seeks capital. After
scrutinizing the start-up’s business plan, an experienced venture capitalist is likely
in a better position than the founder to assess the (latent) price the company’s
shares might garner from future investors. Alternatively, a strategic acquirer may
have a better idea of the start-up’s stand-alone potential in the product market.
The problem in these situations is that the “smart” buyer is tempted to un-
derstate the seller’s outside option, and this causes a rational seller to be suspicious
of any proposed terms of trade. This contrasts with the lemons problem in which
a better informed seller is tempted to overstate the buyer’s inside option. For-
mally, both are problems of one-sided asymmetric information about a common
value, except that the identity of the informed party differs. Despite this apparent
difference, the problems are intimately related: by switching the numeraire from
cash to the asset (and hence the role of “buyer” and “seller”), the lemons problem
can be cast as a smart buyer problem and vice versa. Indeed, mechanism design
with common values studies equilibrium existence and efficiency without being ex-
plicit about the particular role (e.g., buyer or seller) that the informed agents play
(Maskin and Tirole 1992; Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001); the general conditions for
truthful mechanisms do not depend on the role of the informed party or whether
the informed party wants to overstate or understate the common value.
Numerous papers in economics and finance examine the one-sided asymmet-
ric information problem in specific transactions or (institutional) settings. This
applied literature focuses on the “shape” of the optimal contract to explain ob-
served real-world contracts. A prominent example in finance is Myers and Majluf
(1984)’s explanation of debt as the optimal security for raising capital from less
informed investors. Interestingly, almost all of the work in this literature – starting
with the seminal papers by Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973) – has focused on
the lemons problem (see, e.g., the surveys by Riley 2001 and Hörner 2008).
We extend this applied perspective to the smart buyer problem for two reasons:
First, in many transactions or settings it is plausible that the buyer, as opposed to
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the seller, is better informed. Examples, apart from the aforementioned venture
capitalist or strategic investor, include management buyout teams, commercial
land developers, or publishers. It is of interest to learn which contractual arrange-
ments help to resolve the smart buyer problem and to which extent they match
real-world contracts. Second, it is further of interest to compare contractual solu-
tions to the lemons and smart buyer problems given their close connection. This
comparison is an indispensable step for correctly identifying or discriminating the
two information frictions in empirical work.
Our analysis yields three main insights: First, purchase offers are persuasive
once they include upside participation for the seller. This mutes the buyer’s incen-
tives to understate the asset value, and most effectively so through a contract that
gives the seller a convex claim. By means of illustration, consider a publisher who
knows the market potential of a manuscript. The author suspects that the price
is too low and is reluctant to accept a pure cash offer. To overcome this suspicion,
the publisher has to combine the cash offer with royalties. Incentive compatibility
(truth-telling) requires an inverse relationship between the cash price and royal-
ties such that, for a valuable manuscript, the publisher is willing to pay a higher
cash price to keep a larger share of the revenues. Conversely, for a less valuable
manuscript, keeping the larger revenue share does not sufficiently compensate the
publisher for the higher cash price. Furthermore, under the optimal contract, the
author’s royalty share is adjusted upward when the sales volume is very high. Such
convex royalties are used in practice and known as “escalation clauses.”
Second, contracts commonly associated with the lemons problem may well
be manifestations of smart buyer problems. To overcome the lemons problem, a
contract must provide downside protection to the buyer. To outside observers,
such a contract is isomorphic to a contract that provides upside participation to
the seller. One example of this observational equivalence is debt. As mentioned,
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that issuing debt is optimal when investors are
less informed. We show that an entrepreneur faced with better informed investors
wants to retain the upside. That is, the start-up founder of our opening example
would want to issue a more senior claim to the seasoned venture capitalist or even
opt for a venture loan.1 Thus, debt can be optimal, both when investors know less
1Solomon, S. D. “The wisest entrepreneurs know how to preserve equity," New York Times,
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and when they know more than the issuer. Ownership retention, cash-equity bids,
and contingent value rights are other examples of such observational equivalence.
Third, the smart buyer problem and the lemons problem can have opposite
cross-sectional implications. An uninformed buyer is most reluctant to trade at
high prices, whereas an uninformed seller is most reluctant to trade at low prices.
Thus, the relationship between price and quantity is the opposite in the lemons
and smart buyer problems. For example, in Leland and Pyle (1977), the informed
entrepreneur signals a high firm value by selling a smaller equity stake to unin-
formed investors. In the smart buyer setting, the informed investor signals a low
firm value by buying a smaller equity stake from the uninformed entrepreneur.
While the ownership stake retained by the seller is a signal in either case, more
retention signals a higher firm value in the lemons problem, but a lower firm value
in the smart buyer problem.
Such conflicting predictions are not specific to this example and pose a chal-
lenge for empirically testing for the role of asymmetric information. Consider an
empiricist who equates asymmetric information frictions (in a particular setting)
with the lemons problem and does not find supporting cross-sectional evidence in
the transactions data. The empiricist may falsely conclude that asymmetric infor-
mation is not important, although, in fact, the lemons and smart buyer problems
may be simultaneously present in the data such that the cross-sectional traces
of asymmetric information wash out in the average effect. This has implications
for empirical design: one should not associate a specific contract design with a
particular asymmetric information structure (such as debt with the lemons prob-
lem). Further, instead of trying to infer the asymmetric information problem from
the data, one should try to a priori’ classify individual transactions into different
information structures and separately analyze the cross-sectional patterns for the
resultant subsamples.
As mentioned earlier, the financial contracting literature typically assumes that
the seller is better informed about the asset value.2 The main exception is a series
of papers showing that in auctions the seller optimally issues debt to informed bid-
November 15, 2011.
2See, e.g., Leland and Pyle (1977), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Myers and Majluf (1984),
De Meza and Webb (1987), Diamond (1991), Nachman and Noe (1994), DeMarzo and Duffie
(1999), and Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2011).
4
ders (Hansen 1985; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 2000; DeMarzo, Kremer, and
Skrzypacz 2005; Axelson 2007). Confining the competing bidders to debt claims
in the underlying asset minimizes differences in their willingness to pay, thereby
maximizing the seller’s expected payoff. If, instead, the bidders could choose how
to bid, they would keep equity to maximize their own rents (DeMarzo, Kremer,
and Skrzypacz 2005).3 By contrast, in the smart buyer problem, buyers may
voluntarily confine themselves to debt because doing so most effectively reveals
their private information and induces the seller to accept the offer.4
Theories of share repurchases are the other exception. In these theories a
firm wants to reveal a high value of its own shares through repurchases, either
(1) because it cares about its (interim) share price (e.g., Bhattacharya 1980;
Vermaelen 1984; Miller and Rock 1985) or (2) because it plans to subsequently
issue shares to fund investment (e.g., John and Williams 1985; Ambarish, John,
and Williams 1987; Williams 1988). Clearly, these are not smart buyer problems
in which buyers want to conceal high valuations. However, in a recent paper,
Bond and Zhong (2016) construct partially separating equilibria in which some
firm types pool with types that repurchase shares for the second reason above,
with the intention to acquire shares at a bargain – like a smart buyer.
There are, to our knowledge, only two papers (both outside of finance) that
explicitly deal with the smart buyer problem: Beggs (1992) studies licensing con-
tracts between a better informed developer and an inventor and shows that the
developer can reveal information through linear royalties. We show that the opti-
mal royalty is nonlinear (escalation clauses) and consider additional applications.
In independent work, Dari-Mattiacci, Onderstal, and Parisi (2010) compare pool-
3It has also been shown that sellers may prefer not to issue debt when the bidders have private
information about investment costs (Che and Kim 2010) or when there is competition among
sellers (Gorbenko and Malenko 2011).
4Related to the above auction literature, DeMarzo (2005) analyzes whether multiple assets
should be pooled or tranched prior to a sale. Considering both more and less informed sellers, he
shows that less informed sellers pool assets to avoid “cherry-picking” by better informed buyers.
A few other papers with privately informed investors, on closer inspection, are applications of
the lemons problem. In Inderst and Mueller (2006), a lender privately learns the borrower’s
inside option (payoff from borrowing). Their setting is thus a lemons problem: the lender “sells”
a loan product that may or may not be good for the borrower. In the takeover models of Hansen
(1987) and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990), acquirers have private information, but
this information pertains to their own assets. They want to overstate their value, which creates
a lemons problem for the target shareholders.
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ing outcomes in the generic smart buyer problem to those in the lemons problem.
We study pooling and separating equilibria in the smart buyer problem and show
that equilibrium refinement selects the optimal separating contract.5
1 Framework
We formulate a generic bilateral trade model that accommodates a variety of
transactions involving indivisible and divisible goods, as well as assets that gen-
erate verifiable or nonverifiable returns. For each type of transaction, we provide
real-world examples and explore whether the smart buyer can signal the common
value of the good.
1.1 Model
A buyer approaches a seller, who possesses one unit of a tradable asset. A trans-
action is characterized by a pair (q, t) where q ∈ Q ⊂ [0, 1] is the traded quantity
and t is the total (net) cash transfer from the buyer to the seller. The payoffs of
the seller and buyer from a completed trade are, respectively,
U (q; ·) = θx (1− q) + t,
V (q; ·) = θxq + z (q; ·)− t.
The parameter θx captures the seller’s outside option, whereas z (q; ·) reflects
the gains from trade. That is, θx is a common value and z (q; ·) is the buyer’s
private value component. For example, θx could be the (expected) price a latent
alternative buyer would pay, in which case z (q; ·) would be the value-added by the
present buyer relative to the latent alternative buyer. The linearity of the seller’s
valuation simplifies the analysis, but is not critical to the qualitative insights.
We assume that z = z(q; θx, θz) and is twice continuously differentiable. That
5There is also a large literature on bilateral trading with one-sided asymmetric information
about private values (c.f. Bolton and Dewatripont 2004). In such settings, efficiency is restored
by giving full bargaining power to the informed party, who then simply sets the price equal to the
counterparty’s reservation value. By contrast, shifting bargaining power in our common value
setting does not restore efficiency.
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is, the buyer’s private gains depend on the traded quantity q, factors determining
the common value (captured by θx), and other factors (captured by θz). For
example, θx is the objective quality of a car as the determinant of its market price,
and θz is the buyer’s idiosyncratic pleasure from driving.
Assumption 1. z ≥ 0, zq > 0, zθx > 0, zθz ≥ 0, zqθx ≥ 0, and zqθz ≥ 0.
The buyer’s private gains are nonnegative and increase in q, θx, and θz. Further,
they increase marginally more in q when θx or θz are larger. Assumption 1 implies
that the single-crossing condition holds and that the efficient outcome is full trade
(q = 1). For the analysis, u (q; ·) = θx (1− q) and v (q; ·) = θxq + z (q; ·) denote
valuations excluding transfers. Last, while not strictly necessary for our results,
it makes sense to assume z(0; ·) = 0; if no trade occurs, there are no gains from
trade.
The parameters θx and θz are continuously distributed on Θx×Θz = [θx, θx]×
[θz, θz] according to a commonly known distribution. The true parameters (θx, θz)
are realized prior to the offer. We now introduce our central assumption.
Assumption 2. Only the buyer observes θx.
Put differently, the seller knows less than the buyer about its own outside
option. With respect to θz, our analysis presumes symmetric information, so that
the buyer’s type (information advantage) is one-dimensional and given by θx ∈ Θx.
For simplicity, we assume that θz is common knowledge. Nonetheless, the buyer has
superior information both about the seller’s outside option θx and about the gains
from trade z, though θx is a sufficient statistic for the buyer’s superior information
about both. (Assuming instead that neither party observes θz does not change the
qualitative results.)
Events unfold as in a standard signaling game: the buyer privately observes θx
and then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The seller decides whether
to accept the offer. If the offer is accepted, the transaction is consummated. Other-
wise, the game ends without a transaction. We use perfect Bayesian equilibrium as
the solution concept and later the intuitive criterion to refine the set of equilibria.
We now introduce two conditions that render our model applicable to a range
of bilateral trade situations, as the examples in the next section illustrate.
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Condition V: v (q; ·) is verifiable.
Condition V (for “verifiability”) is satisfied when a third party, such as a court,
can verify the buyer’s valuation (only) after trade has taken place. If Condition V
holds, cash transfers can be made contingent on the buyer’s valuation; otherwise,
only fixed transfers (for a given quantity) are feasible. Note that, under Condition
V, the buyer’s valuation is verifiable as a whole, but not as individual components.
We also consider two extreme cases of divisibility. We assume that the asset is
either indivisible or satisfies Condition D.
Condition D: Q = [0, 1].
Condition D (for “divisibility”) states that the asset is perfectly divisible. When
Condition D is not satisfied, the asset is traded in its entirety or not at all.
To see the difference between Conditions V and D, consider, for example, a firm
as a collection of real assets. Condition D means that the firm’s real assets can be
broken up among different parties (asset sales). Condition V means that the firm
can be “shared” by issuing claims to the firm’s cash flow, while the management
of the assets is undivided (security issuance). Once Condition V holds, Condition
D loses relevance (unless there are restrictions on security design), as trading all
of the asset(s) becomes optimal, as we will show in Section 2.3.6
Given this characterization of the trade, a purchase contract takes the form
C = (q, t0, τ(v))
where q is the quantity traded, t0 is a fixed cash transfer, and τ(v) is a cash
transfer contingent on the ex post realization of v. The total cash transfer is thus
t = t0 + τ(v). When Condition V is violated, τ(v) = 0. When Condition D is
violated, q = 1 for any nontrivial purchase offer. Last, let U(C; θx) and V(C; θx)
denote, respectively, the buyer’s and seller’s expected payoffs for a given common
value θx under contract C.
6With restrictions on security design, such as linear sharing rules, the buyer may use quantity
rationing or profit sharing (or both) as signals, depending on which signaling mechanism is
cheaper. This, in turn, depends on the shape of zq(q; θx, θz) relative to z(1; θx, θz). For instance,
if the assets are highly complementary, splitting the assets is highly inefficient and therefore an
inferior signaling device.
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1.2 Applications
To motivate our premise that a buyer may in certain situations have better knowl-
edge of the seller’s outside option than the seller, consider the following examples:
A1: Art collector/investor. An experienced art collector wants to buy a work
from a novice artist. The collector derives hedonic utility from complementing
an existing collection with this work but also has more experience in assessing its
latent market value. Here, θz reflects idiosyncratic hedonic utility, while θx reflects
the market value. Neither Condition V nor Condition D is satisfied.
A2: Securities trading. A sophisticated investor wants to buy securities from a
market maker. The investor gains from the trade partly because it hedges risk ex-
posures specific to the current portfolio. These hedging gains are nonverifiable and
cannot be shared with the market maker. The investor also has private information
about the fundamental value of the securities. Here, θz captures the idiosyncratic
hedging demand, while θx reflects the securities’ fundamentals. Condition D is
satisfied.
A3: Patent. A company wants to buy a patent from a scientist to improve its
products. The scientist knows less about how valuable the patent is for improving
such products. Here, θz may reflect the company’s product market share, while θx
reflects the patent’s latent market value. Condition V is satisfied, but Condition
D is violated if the patent cannot be split up into several saleable parts.
A4: Restructuring. The controlling shareholder of a bankrupt firm offers to
inject new capital in exchange for partial debt forgiveness. While there is consensus
that restructuring is efficient, the controlling shareholder has superior information
about the going concern value and the liquidation value. The creditors question the
proposed terms. Here, θz captures the shareholder’s managerial ability, while θx
reflects the liquidation value. Condition V is satisfied since the postrestructuring
firm value is verifiable, but conditionD is violated insofar as control is not divisible.
A5: Takeover. A firm has entered an industry with new promising ideas but
little experience, and is now the takeover target of an established rival. As the rival
submits its offer, the target is wary of the buy-side valuation of its stand-alone
value. Here, θz reflects acquirer characteristics, while θx reflects the target’s stand-
alone potential. Condition V is satisfied since the posttakeover value of the merged
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firm is verifiable, but condition D is violated insofar as control is not divisible.
A6: Venture capital. A seasoned venture capitalist wants to invest in a start-
up firm and help develop its business and take it public. The venture capitalist
contributes useful experience but also knows more about the start-up’s potential
market value. The firm founders fear conceding too large a stake. Here, θz captures
the venture capitalist’s value-added, while θx reflects the the start-up’s intrinsic
potential. While Condition V is satisfied, Condition D is violated if the operations
of the start-up cannot be split up.
A7: Movie rights. A film studio wants to buy the movie rights to a novel.
Compared to the seller (writer and/or publishing company), the studio can better
assess the box office potential of the novel. The seller is concerned about giving
up a “hidden gem.” Here, θz captures the studio’s movie-making capacities, while
θx reflects the novel’s box office potential. Condition D is violated if rights to
different parts of the novel cannot be sold separately, and Condition V is satisfied
since the revenues from the rights to the novel can be shared.
A8: Hiring talent. A music producer wants exclusive rights to produce the
records of a new musician. While the musician is inexperienced, the producer
has a track record of developing new talent. The musician has reservations about
some of the contract terms and wonders whether a better deal could be obtained
elsewhere or later. Here, θz captures the producer’s capability, and θx reflects the
musician’s talent. Condition V is satisfied, while Condition D would be satisfied
only if the musician could commit part of the creative output to this producer
through a nonexclusive contract.7
7In Chari (1982), firms have private information about their own productivity, while workers’
outside options (reservation wages and unit labor costs) are commonly known. Since productivity
shocks are observed after labor contracts are written, tension arises between (ex ante) insuring
risk-averse workers against shocks and (ex post) truthfully revealing realized shocks. By contrast,
no such tension would arise if firms knew their productivity before contracting or workers were
risk neutral (as in our model), in which case workers would be paid their outside option. Indeed,
the outcome would be efficient as the information advantage concerns a private value. The
friction in our “smart employer” setting is different: the firm has private information (not) about
(its own but) the worker’s productivity. In Spence (1973), of course, workers know their own
productivity, and this constitutes a lemons problem.
10
2 Persuasive Purchase Offers
In this section, we focus on fully revealing equilibria.8 By the revelation principle,
we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms. A direct mechanism, denoted
C(θˆx), maps a buyer’s self-reported type θˆx ∈ Θx into a contract C. In a fully
revealing mechanism, the buyer’s optimal report, or contract proposal, satisfies
arg max
θˆx∈Θx
V(C(θˆx), θx) = θx (1)
and also
U(C(θx), θx) ≥ θx (2)
for all θx ∈ Θx. The incentive compatibility constraint (1) states that the buyer’s
type is truthfully revealed in the offer, that is, in equilibrium θˆx = θx, while the
participation constraint (2) requires that the seller is willing to accept the offer.
We begin our analysis with the case in which the buyer’s payoff is nonverifiable
and the asset may or may not be divisible (Section 2.1). Thereafter, we consider
the case in which the buyer’s payoff is (ex post) verifiable (Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
In either case, we characterize the key properties common to all fully revealing
equilibria, and give special attention to the least cost separating (LCS) equilib-
rium, in which the seller’s participation constraint (2) binds for all θx ∈ Θx. All
mathematical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2.1 Upward-sloping supply
Suppose Condition V is violated, but Condition D is satisfied; transfers cannot be
contingent, but the asset is divisible. So contracts are of the form C = (q, t0, 0).
For a buyer of type θx, the payoff under a given contract is therefore
V(C, θx) = qθx + z (q; θx, θz)− t0 (3)
8Despite a slight abuse of terminology, we use the term fully revealing equilibria also for
semi-separating equilibria in which not all types trade, but those types that do trade are fully
revealed.
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and the seller’s participation constraint is
t0 ≥ qθx. (4)
Proposition 1. (Trade rationing) Suppose only Condition D is satisfied. Deter-
ministic fully revealing equilibria exist, and in all of them transfer t0 and trade
quantity q increase with buyer type θx. The LCS equilibrium is given by the
differential equation
∂q
∂θx
=
q
zq(q; θx, θz)
(5)
and t0 = qθx under the boundary condition q = 1 for θx = θx.
Lower-valued buyer types purchase smaller quantities at lower prices. Quantity
rationing is a means of relinquishing gains from trade to credibly signal a lower
valuation. The single-crossing condition implied by Assumption 1 ensures that
high-valued types have more (gains from trade) to lose by trading a smaller quan-
tity and hence refrain from mimicking low-valued types. Conversely, low-valued
types do not mimic high-valued types because the price increase outweighs their
gains from trading more.
There exist multiple separating schedules, all of which satisfy the property that
the trade quantity is increasing in the common value, that can be supported as
perfect Bayesian equilibria. In any of these equilibria, the buyer appropriates no
part of the common value, in turn, implying that the buyer’s type is not signaled by
forgoing common value, but rather by relinquished private gains z when purchasing
less than all the asset. The equilibria differ in the magnitude of the rents earned
by the seller across buyer types. In the LCS equilibrium, characterized by (5),
the seller never earns a rent. That is, the participation constraint binds for every
buyer type and the unit price t0/q equals the common value θx.9
Since quantities and the unit price are increasing in θx, the “supply” curve is
upward-sloping, or put differently, the seller demands a quantity premium rather
9The boundary condition follows from the fact that the seller is always willing to sell the
entire asset for t0 = θx because the true common value cannot be higher. Consequently, the
highest buyer type cannot be held to a payoff less than the profit under this offer, which must
therefore be the offer she makes in the LCS equilibrium.
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than a discount.10 By contrast, the lemons problem generates a downward-sloping
“demand” curve, under which larger quantities are traded at lower unit prices. For
example, capital market illiquidity has been modeled as downward-sloping demand
(DeMarzo and Duffie 1999).
Example 1 (Illiquidity). Consider a simple two-period model of financial
trade (A2). A buyer and a seller are each endowed with (zero-interest) cash to
support trade. The seller is further endowed with one unit of a security that yields
an uncertain payoff θ˜x ∈ Θx later at date 1, where Θx = (1, θx].
The seller’s and the buyer’s consumption utilities are, respectively,
u(c) = c0 + c1 and v(c) = c0 + (1 + θ˜z)c1,
where ct denotes date-t consumption, and θ˜z ∈ {−θz, θz} is a consumption prefer-
ence shock. If θ˜z = −θz, the buyer is impatient and prefers consumption at date
0. If θ˜z = θz, the buyer is patient and prefers consumption at date 1. By contrast,
the seller is indifferent with respect to the timing of consumption.
When θ˜z = −θz, the buyer uses wealth to consume at date 0, and there is no
demand for trading the security. However, when θ˜z = θz, the buyer would like
to invest some wealth in the security to increase date 1 consumption. If both
knew the realization of θx at date 0, the buyer would simply offer t0 = θx and
would enjoy additional benefits of z(1; θx, θz) = θzθx. When only the buyer learns
the true return θx, fully revealing equilibria are characterized by 1. In particular,
condition (5) becomes
∂q
∂θx
=
q
θzθx
,
since z(q; θx, θz) = θzθxq in this example. Integrating on both sides and using the
10Maskin and Riley (1994) derive conditions under which a monopolistic seller offers quantity
discounts to buyers who are better informed about their private valuation of the good. In their
setting, however, the seller’s participation constraint above is absent: since there is no common
value component, there is no smart buyer problem, and the seller’s reservation price does not
increase with the buyer type. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, giving buyers all the bargaining
power in their setting restores efficiency.
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boundary condition q = 1 for θx = θx, yields the LCS equilibrium schedule
q =
(
θx
θx
)1/θz
. (6)
Since the equilibrium per-unit price is θx, (6) describes an upward-sloping supply
curve. One can invert (6) to derive an equilibrium price function
P = θxq
θz .
The slope of this function ∂P/∂q = θzθxqθz−1 reflects the price impact of a given
quantity order, akin to Kyle (1985)’s λ, though not a constant. Supply is upward-
sloping: for q > 0 (buy orders), the price impact is positive (quantity premium).
Both trade quantity q and price P are strictly increasing in θz for all θx < θx.
(Recall that q < 1 for all θx < θx and q = 1 for θx = θx.) When noninformational
trade motives are less important (smaller θz), the seller is more suspicious of buy
offers, which translates into less trade and higher price impact (less liquidity).
The equilibrium when both Conditions D and V are violated constitutes a
special case of Proposition 1. Under these conditions, a trade is consummated
under a contract of the form C = (1, t0, 0). Given the trade quantity is fixed, there
cannot be any deterministic separating equilibrium by the law of one price: two
different prices for a given quantity cannot be sustained in equilibrium, since all
bidder types would select the lower t0.
To construct separating equilibria, one has to allow for stochastic contracts.
Under a stochastic contract C˜, a deterministic contract C is randomly implemented
according to a probability distribution, g(C). For a buyer of type θx, the expected
payoff under a stochastic contract C˜ is
Π(C˜; θx) = p[θx + z (1; θx, θz)− t10]− (1− p)t00
= p[θx + z (1; θx, θz)]− t¯0. (7)
where p ≡ Pr (q = 1), t10 ≡ E(t0 |q = 1), t00 ≡ E(t0 |q = 0), and t¯0 ≡ E(t0) under
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the probability distribution g. The seller’s participation constraint becomes
t¯0 ≥ pθx. (8)
The payoff-relevant properties of C˜ are thus summarized by p and t¯0.
Note that (7) and (8) are isomorphic to (3) and (4). This becomes apparent
once one relabels q as p and chooses the private value function z (q; θx, θz) = qz
with z ≡ z (1; θx, θz). Thus, Proposition 1 applies. The differential equation (5)
characterizing the LCS schedule becomes ∂p
∂θx
= p
z
, which has the explicit solution
p = exp
[
−
ˆ θx
θx
[z(1; s, θz)]
−1ds
]
under the boundary condition p = 1 for θx = θx. Furthermore, the expected
transfer is t¯0 = pθx.
Both trade probability p and expected transfer t¯0 are increasing in buyer type
θx. A lower-valued buyer credibly reveals her type by accepting a higher risk of
trade failure.11 With less to gain, lower-valued types are less keen on trading and
so bid less aggressively. This generates an stochastic upward-sloping supply curve;
a higher price makes it more likely that the seller supplies the asset. By contrast,
in a lemons problem, higher prices go together with lower trade probabilities.
2.2 Equity retention
In this section, we assume that only Condition V holds; while the good cannot
be divided, transfers can be made contingent on v(·). A classic application of the
lemons problem in which Condition V holds is an entrepreneur who wants to issue
equity, but faces less informed investors who are reluctant to buy (Leland and Pyle
1977). By contrast, we conceive of an inexperienced entrepreneur reluctant to sell
equity to a sophisticated investor who is better at valuing the firm.
Feasible deterministic contracts now take the form C = (1, t0, τ(v)). We allow
for more general contingent contracts below, but begin with the simple category
11In the context of tender offers, Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) construct an analogous sepa-
rating equilibrium in which higher prices go together with higher takeover probabilities.
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of (unlevered) equity: linear sharing rules for which τ(v) = (1− α)v.
For a buyer of type θx, the payoff from a profit sharing contract is
V(C, θx) = α[θx + z (1; θx, θz)]− t0. (9)
The seller’s participation constraint is t0 + (1− α) [θx + z(1; θx, θz)] ≥ θx and can
be rearranged to
t0 ≥ αθx − (1− α)z(1; θx, θz). (10)
The buyer’s objective function is essentially the same as under (stochastic) trade
rationing; relabeling α as p and t0 as t¯0 shows that (9) is isomorphic to (7). The
difference between profit sharing and trade rationing is the seller’s participation
constraints (10) and (8). While αθx is the seller’s reservation price, both in (10)
and (8), the upfront transfer t0 can be smaller than αθx only in (10). This is
because, under profit sharing, the seller also receives (1−α)z(1; θx, θz) of the gains
from trade through the contingent payment in addition to the upfront transfer.
Emphasizing this point, when the seller’s share of revenue is large, the opti-
mal cash payment may even be negative, in which case the transaction actually
switches from a smart buyer problem into a lemons problem. To stay within the
confines of the smart buyer problem, that is, to ensure a positive cash transfer t0
in equilibrium, we impose the additional assumption that the lowest buyer type
θx generates no trade surplus:
Assumption 3. z(1; θx, θz) = 0.
This guarantees that our setting remains, in equilibrium, a “means-of-payment”
problem in which the buyer pays the seller with an optimally chosen combination
of cash and equity.
Proposition 2. (Linear sharing) Suppose only Condition V is satisfied and con-
tingent transfers are restricted to linear sharing rules. Deterministic fully revealing
equilibria exist, and in all of them upfront transfer t0 and the buyer’s revenue share
α increase with her type θx. If
α =
zθx(1; θx, θz)
1 + zθx(1; θx, θz)
(11)
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is strictly increasing in θx ∈ Θx, the LCS equilibrium exists and is given by (11)
and the schedule C(θx) = (1, αθx − (1− α)z(1; θx, θz), (1− α)v(1; θx, θz)).
In any equilibrium, there is a negative relationship between the common value
θx and the fraction 1− α of equity retained by the seller. The buyer’s willingness
to leave more equity with the seller credibly signals a low valuation. Under the
equilibrium contract schedule, understating the common value is not profitable
because the gains from paying a lower cash price are outweighed by the cost of
conceding more equity. Conversely, overstating the common value is not profitable
since the gains from a larger share of equity do not compensate for the higher cash
price.
An illustration of Proposition 2 is an inexperienced entrepreneur who wants to
issue equity. Confronted with smart investors, the entrepreneur is reluctant to give
up (equity) ownership to the extent of being wary of being fooled into a bargain
– and the suspicion is greater when the offered price is lower.12 By contrast, in
the lemons problem studied by Leland and Pyle (1977), the relationship between
common value and equity retention by the seller is the opposite. A better-informed
entrepreneur retains equity because selling (more of) it would be a poor signal,
and this concern is more relevant when the common value is higher.
If (11) is strictly increasing for all θx ∈ Θx, a LCS equilibrium exists in which
(PC) binds for all types. This is the case when zθxθx > 0 for all θx ∈ Θx. Such
convexity of z in θx makes it increasingly unattractive for higher types to relinquish
equity to the extent that lower-valued types need not relinquish more equity than
required to satisfy the seller’s participation constraint without being mimicked.
Otherwise, some buyer types must concede positive rents to the seller. Even so,
the buyer can be made weakly better off by conceding rents than by not trading.
Thus, an efficient equilibrium always exists in which the entire asset is traded
(unlike under deterministic trade rationing).
Example 2 (Means of payment in takeovers). Consider a young firm
facing a takeover proposal by an established rival (A5). The rival has conducted
thorough due diligence, and knows enough to gauge its reservation value v(1; θx, θz)
12Cf. Solomon, S. D. “The wisest entrepreneurs know how to preserve equity," New York
Times, November 15, 2011.
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as well as the target’s stand-alone going-concern value θx. By contrast, being less
experienced, the target is unsure about θx.
Suppose
z(1; θx, θz) = (kθx)
θz
where k > 0 and θz > 1 are the acquirer’s productivity parameters and commonly
known. Since
zθxθx = k
θzθz(θz − 1)θxθz−2 > 0,
the LCS equilibrium exists and (11) becomes
α =
kθzθzθx
θz−1
1 + kθzθzθxθz−1
(12)
with
∂α
∂θx
=
zθxθx
(1 + kθzθzθxθz−1)2
> 0.
Given the seller’s binding participation constraint (10), the upfront transfer is
t0 = αθx − (1− α)z(1; θx, θz). Using (12), the per-share cash price P ≡ t0α is
P =
(
1− 1
θz
)
θx
which is strictly positive and strictly increasing in θx. From ∂α∂θx > 0 and
∂P
∂θx
> 0,
it follows that ∂P
∂α
> 0. That is, the per-share cash consideration is increasing in
the fraction of equity acquired by the buyer (or decreasing in the fraction of equity
“paid” to the seller).
The total value of the LCS cash-equity offer equals the seller’s reservation value
θx. The fraction of the takeover consideration paid in cash can be expressed as
t0
θx
=
αP
θx
= α
(
1− 1
θz
)
.
Since ∂α
∂θx
> 0, the “cash ratio” is positively related to the total takeover valuation
θx. This is consistent with the empirical evidence that takeover announcement
returns are negatively correlated with the proportion of the takeover consideration
paid in equity. By contrast, a lemons problem with a better-informed acquirer will
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generate the opposite equilibrium relationship. Indeed, to match the empirical
pattern, the means-of-payment literature has resorted to models with two-sided
asymmetric information (Hansen 1987; Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel 1990).13
Our analysis shows that one-sided private information on the part of the acquirer
can also explain the empirical pattern.
2.3 Security design
We now relax the restriction to linear sharing rules and allow for general contingent
transfers τ(·). The buyer chooses C = (1, t0, τ(v)) to maximize
V(C; θx) = θx + z (x; θx, θz)− t0 − E[τ(v) |θx ]. (13)
Given that θz is commonly known, the buyer knows exactly how large the contin-
gent payment will be. In fact, E[τ(v) |θx ] = τ(v(1; θx, θz)), which greatly simplifies
the contracting problem.
Proposition 3. (Security design) Suppose Condition V is satisfied. A fully re-
vealing equilibrium exists in which buyer type θx acquires the good in exchange
for a fixed transfer t0 = θx and a contingent transfer
τ(v) =
{
0 if v ≤ v(1; θx, θz)
v − v(1; θx, θz) if v > v(1; θx, θz)
, (14)
thereby retaining the entire trade surplus, as under symmetric information.
Under the contract characterized by (14), the seller is awarded additional pay-
ments if the payoff exceeds a certain threshold. If the threshold is set optimally,
granting the seller such upside participation prevents the buyer from understating
the value of the asset. As a result, all buyer types acquire the entire asset and
extract the full surplus.14
13Models in which the means of payment serve to deter potential rival bidders are a notable
exception (e.g., Fishman 1988, 1989).
14From a mechanism design perspective, it is not surprising that the buyer can extract the
entire gains from trade through the use of contingent payments. In a setting with interdependent
values, Mezzetti (2007) shows that mechanisms in which transfers can be conditioned on (reports
of) realized payoffs generally allow the principal to extract the entire surplus.
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Formally, for q = 1 and a given θz, the buyer’s valuation v is a one-to-one
mapping from Θx to [v(1; θx, θz), v(1; θx, θz)]. Moreover, v is strictly increasing in
θx. Consequently, one can use a simple scheme to punish the buyer for understating
θx: the buyer incurs a penalty if and only if the realized v is larger than v(1; θˆx, θz),
the valuation implied by the reported type θˆx. The penalty specified in Proposition
3 requires the buyer to pay the difference v − v(1; θˆx, θz), and this amounts to
writing a call option with strike price v(1; θˆx, θz).15 In sum, under this contract,
the seller’s overall claim t = τ+t0 is monotone (∂t/∂v ≥ 0), convex (∂2t/∂v2 ≥ 0),
and respects the buyer’s limited liability (t ≤ v).
Such call options resolve the smart buyer problem even when θz is unobserved
by either party. Under Assumption 1, the support of v also differs across buyer
types for unobservable θz. The maximum of the support v(θx, θz) would be strictly
increasing in θx, and a penalty scheme almost identical to the one in Proposition 3
would implement the efficient outcome. But, even if the support of v were identical
for all types, an incentive-compatible penalty scheme would exist under additional
restrictions on the set of distributions and could be implemented with debt and
levered equity (Burkart and Lee 2015).
Example 3 (“20-against-20”). Consider an example of “hiring talent” (A8).
A film studio wants an actor for a lead role in a new movie. The studio is better
informed about industry factors that determine the actor’s latent outside options
(θx), and it can better estimate the movie’s box office potential (v(1; θx, θz)). A
producer and a director are already contracted, both well-known and experienced
(high θz).
Otherwise reluctant to commit to the project in hopes of better options, the
actor asks for a high salary (t+0 ). Finding the actor’s demand too high (t
+
0 > θx),
the studio instead offers to pay the larger of a cash salary t0 and a share α of
the revenues v: max {t0, αv}. In essence, this compensation package amounts to
a fixed salary supplemented by a fraction of revenues, provided that the revenues
exceed a certain threshold.
Such convex compensation exists in the film industry. One better-known exam-
15While other contingent payment schemes exist that support an efficient outcome, the pro-
posed scheme is the monotonic claim that minimizes ex post payments.
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ple is the so-called “20-against-20” contract, whereby an actor effectively receives
the larger of $20 million and 20% of the movie’s gross revenues.16 This creates
upside participation; the payoff is flat until the revenues reach $100 million but
thereafter increases linearly with further revenues. Weinstein (1998) indeed ar-
gues that one explanation for these contracts is that studios are better informed
than are actors. Thus, the smart buyer problem offers an alternative explanation
for convex compensation contracts, which are usually attributed to moral hazard
problems.
The contingent payments in a “20-against-20” contract are, in a way, nonlinear
royalties. Such royalties also exist in other intellectual property transactions. Pub-
lishing contracts often contain so-called escalation clauses, whereby the publisher
pays the author a royalty rate that is increasing in sales. For example, a higher
royalty rate may kick in once sales surpass a pre-specified target.17
In mergers and acquisitions, nonlinear contingent payments are referred to as
contingent value rights (CVRs). In the words of practitioners, when an “acquirer’s
offer is spurned as too low by a target corporation, the deal can be sweetened [em-
phasis added] by using CVRs to promise future rewards.”18 For example, earnout
clauses specify supplementary payments when the target’s operational or financial
performance exceeds predetermined threshold levels within a given time period af-
ter the acquisition. Similarly, “antiembarrassment” clauses specify supplementary
payments when the buyer resells the asset at a higher price within a prespecified
period. Such payments amount to an adjustment of the original price, protecting
the original seller from the possible “embarrassment” of having sold the asset for
too low a price.19
16For example, Tom Cruise signed a 20-against-20 contract for Valkyrie.
17Goetzmann et al. (2007) find that the (ex post) most successful screenplays traded at higher
and less contingent prices, experienced screenwriters are most likely to receive fixed payments,
and film studios forecast the box office success of scripts well. These empirical patterns are
consistent with our results, suggesting smart buyer problems in the market for screenplays.
18Stocker, M. “Shadowy shares: The dark side of contingent value rights," Forbes, May 9, 2011.
19In the past land purchase programs in India have led to violent protests because the sellers—
mainly rural farmers—have felt cheated out of their land. The government acted as a straw buyer
to buy the land cheaply at the behest of private developers. In hindsight, the indignant farmers
wanted damages in recompense. As for new deals, they have demanded price appreciation rights,
that is, a convex claim on the land value. See, for example, Barman, A. “Get the government out
of land deals," The Economic Times, September 21, 2010. Venkatesan, J. “Return Noida land
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As already mentioned in the previous section, a salient concern of entrepreneurs
is that they let investors buy-in at bargain prices. This concern can be alleviated
by retaining the (most) convex claim. Entrepreneurs of venture capital financed
firms usually obtain more cash flow rights when company performance improves,
while the venture capitalists hold cash flow rights senior to those held by the
entrepreneur when the firm performs poorly (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003).20
Propositions 2 and 3 illustrate two effects that verifiability of v (Condition V)
and the use of contingent transfers have on the solution to the smart buyer problem.
First, trade becomes efficient, since revenue sharing replaces more wasteful means
of relinquishing gains from trade, such as rationing. Second, the buyer appropriates
more of the trade surplus in the absence of restrictions on the contract form, since
security design enhances the buyer’s ability to commit to truthful behavior.
A noteworthy proviso is that both results rely on the implicit assumption that
contingent transfers do not affect the surplus. This is debatable in some applica-
tions. For example, CVRs can reduce an acquirer’s incentives to improve a target’s
posttakeover value, creating a tension between signaling and incentive provision.
3 Lemons or Smart Buyers?
3.1 Observationally equivalent contracts
The difference between the smart buyer and the lemons problem is reflected in op-
posite signaling incentives and the respective solutions: an informed seller wants
to convey a high value. As a result, downside protection, which recompenses the
uninformed buyer if expectations are not met, must be provided. In contrast, an
informed buyer wants to convey a low value, which calls for upside participation,
whereby the uninformed seller is recompensed if expectations are surpassed. Ac-
cordingly, the security design solution of Proposition 3 provides the uninformed
seller with a convex claim, τ(v) = max{0, v − v(1; θx, θz)}. As v increases from
zero, the payoff from this claim is constant until v = v(1; θx, θz) and thereafter
to villagers, orders Supreme Court," The Hindu, July 6, 2011. Keelor, V., and A. Arvind. “Give
share in developed land: Farmers," The Times of India, July 24, 2011.
20Nevertheless, venture capitalists’ cash flow claims may be convex in overall firm performance
due to third-party debt financing.
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Insert Figure 1 about here
Figure 1: Optimal securities
The graph illustrates the security design solution. It plots the value of the con-
tingent claims allocated to the seller and the buyer as functions of total realized
value (v). The smart buyer optimally reveals her information by offering levered
equity to the seller (solid), and consequently retains a debt claim (dashed).
increases linearly. The informed buyer’s payoff is thus concave, increasing linearly
until v = v(1; θx, θz) and constant thereafter. As Figure 1 illustrates, these claims
represent standard securities, debt for the buyer, and levered equity for the seller.
Interestingly, this is also the optimal claim structure when the seller is better
informed. For example, according to the pecking order theory, debt best protects
less informed investors from buying overvalued securities (Myers and Majluf 1984;
DeMarzo and Duffie 1999). In our setting, debt best protects the issuer from selling
undervalued securities to better informed investors. Thus, the lemons problem and
the smart buyer problem can lead to observationally equivalent contracts.
There are other examples of this equivalence. Consider cash-equity payments
in mergers and acquisitions. The standard explanation for the use of equity as
a means of payment is based on the assumption that target shareholders have
private information about the target (e.g., Hansen 1987; Eckbo, Giammarino,
and Heinkel 1990).21 However, the use of equity is, as we have shown, just as
rational when the acquirer has private information about the target. Similarly, it
has been shown that royalties can convey not only information from licensors to
licensees (Gallini and Wright 1990), but also vice versa (Beggs 1992). Analogous
arguments apply to other contractual provisions, such as earnouts and “20-against-
20.”22 It is therefore fallacious to build empirical tests on the presumption that
any of the above contracts – say, debt – are (only) a sign of better-informed sellers.
21In both models, while both the target and the acquirer are privately informed, the target’s
private information gives equity a role as a means of payment. If only the acquirer were privately
informed, cash would be the only means of payment in equilibrium.
22For example, Datar, Frankel, and Wolfson (2001) argue that earnouts resolve the lemons
problem, and Weinstein (1998) acknowledges that nonlinear actor salaries could, in principle,
also reflect a lemons problem.
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Insert Figure 2 about here
Figure 2: Opposite cross-sectional predictions
The two graphs illustrate that the smart buyer problem and the lemons problem
can have opposite cross-sectional implications. In the case of trade rationing,
a larger trade quantity signals a higher value in the smart buyer problem, but a
lower value in the lemons problem (2A). In the case of ownership structure, a larger
stake retained by the issuer signals a lower value in the smart buyer problem, but
a higher value in the lemons problem (2B).
3.2 Opposite cross-sectional implications
In view of the equivalence discussed above, real-world contracts may be insufficient
to empirically identify the underlying information problem. Hence, in addition to
the contract shape, one could try to take into account the division of surplus.
Signaling costs are borne by the seller in the lemons problem, and by the buyer
in the smart buyer problem. For instance, identifying the party willing to pay for
third-party verification, such as due diligence or fairness opinions, could help to
discriminate between the two information problems. However, in practice, it is
difficult to attribute such expenses to one or the other party, because they may be
laid out by one party, but accounted for in the transaction price.
Alternatively, one can study how contracts relate to (revealed) common value,
which reflects the distribution of rents across common value types. This relation
changes with the identity of the informed party. Let us extend the financial trade
application (Example 1) by giving the informed party an endowment that it wants
to sell in case of impatience, thereby introducing a lemons problem. In equilibrium,
the relationship between trade quantity q and common value θx is positive when
the informed party wants to buy, but negative when it wants to sell. Identifying
trade “direction” is therefore important.23
Accounting for trade direction also matters in other settings, such as those
discussed in Section 2.2. In equity issues, the price is positively related to the
23The slope of the transaction curves in Figure 2A is similar to the “price impact” in mar-
ket microstructure models such as Kyle (1985) or Glosten and Milgrom (1985). This is not
surprising since market makers in those models deal with better informed buyers and sellers.
Unlike empirical contract theory or corporate finance, empirical market microstructure research
has therefore long tried to identify trade direction, that is, whether a trade is an informed buy
or sell (e.g., Lee and Ready 1991).
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stake retained by a better informed issuer, as shown by Leland and Pyle (1977).
The opposite relationship obtains in our framework with a less informed issuer.
Similarly, in mergers and acquisitions (Example 3), the relationship between target
value and the cash-equity ratio reverses when the identity of the informed party
switches from buyer to seller.
Being aware of both “contractual equivalence” and “opposite cross-sectional im-
plications” is important when testing for the relevance of asymmetric information
frictions. Suppose a takeover study searches for evidence of the lemons problem,
but finds that takeover premiums (or posttakeover performance) are not decreas-
ing in the cash-equity ratio. This does not warrant the conclusion that asymmetric
information is negligible for the choice of means of payment. In fact, the evidence
could be consistent with the smart buyer problem, or the average effect could be
weak because both information asymmetries with their countervailing effects are
present in the data.24
3.3 Robustness to competition
One may argue that the smart buyer problem is resolved through competition
and therefore lacks relevance in practice. In the model, the problem would indeed
disappear in the presence of a second (equally well) informed buyer; the seller
could guarantee herself the common value by committing to sell the good in an
auction.25 However, this case may not arise in practice for several reasons.
First, competition may not emerge, especially in a common value environment,
when it is costly to become informed. Once one bidder is already informed, any
potential rival does not incur the cost of acquiring information unless it expects
to have substantially larger gains from trade. In fact, the potential buyer with the
largest expected gains from trade has the strongest incentive to become informed
first so as to preempt competition.
24Interestingly, Chang (1998) documents that stock offerings, on average, have a positive
announcement effect on the bidder when the target company is privately held, but a negative
one when the target is publicly held. One possible explanation, suggested also by Chang (1998),
is that the two settings have opposite information asymmetries.
25It is worthwhile noting that homogeneous competition with commitment also eliminates the
lemons problem: buyer’s informational disadvantage becomes immaterial once they face two
equally informed sellers offering identical goods.
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Second, competition may only be latent. A seller may have to wait or search
for a second buyer to receive a competing offer. This is costly and has unknown
benefits to the seller. The expected (net) return from turning latent into actual
competition is one interpretation of the seller’s outside option in our model.
Third, the smart buyer problem persists even with actual competition if the
seller is unable to commit to sell (to the winning bidder). Without commitment,
the seller’s beliefs conditional on bid increases matter for the seller’s willingness
to trade. This may allow for perfect Bayesian equilibria with suitably chosen off-
equilibrium beliefs that deter all bidders from raising their bid above a “pooling”
price equal to the (conditional) expected common value. In such an equilibrium,
certain bidder types overpay (or underpay), and some may be shut out. In other
words, a variant of the smart buyer problem persists.
This is a fortiori the case when bidders have heterogeneous information. In
such a setting, the winning bid may be below the winner’s best estimate of the
common value. Since the seller cannot fully infer the winner’s best estimate from
the bidding process, the two parties may find themselves in a smart buyer problem
once the bidding contest is over.
4 Pooling Outcomes
In related work, Dari-Mattiacci, Onderstal, and Parisi (2010) show that in pooling
equilibria, a market with informed buyers collapses from the bottom, unlike a
market with informed sellers, which collapses from the top. That is, informed
buyers find it impossible to buy low-quality assets at low prices, while informed
sellers find it impossible to sell high-quality goods at high prices. In our framework,
pooling equilibria – like fully revealing equilibria – always exist. However, only
fully revealing equilibria survive the intuitive criterion.
Since the security design solution in Proposition 3 achieves the first-best out-
come, we must exclude it to create a role for pooling outcomes. We thus abstract
from verifiability and focus on trade rationing contracts; only Condition D is sat-
isfied, and contracts take the form C = (q, t0, 0).
Our analysis focuses on pooling equilibria in which passive buyer types offer
the no-trade contract C∅ ≡ (0, 0, 0) and all active buyer types offer a uniform
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contract CP = (qP , tP , 0) 6= C∅.26 Either contract offer must meet the participation
constraints of the buyer and the seller. Clearly, C∅ satisfies this condition. Contract
CP meets the buyer’s participation constraint if and only if the buyer’s type θ ∈ Θ
satisfies
qP θx + z(qP ; θx, θz) ≥ tP . (15)
For a given CP , let ΘP denote the subset of buyer types for which (15) holds.
Similarly, CP satisfies the seller’s participation constraint if and only if
tP ≥ qPE [θx| CP ] . (16)
In words, the seller must believe that the offered transfer at least matches the
forgone common value, given beliefs that are conditional on the observed offer. To
determine the conditional expectation in (16), the seller must conjecture which
subset of Θ prefers CP over C∅. Let ΘˇP denote this conjecture.
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, {CP , C∅} must satisfy (15) and (16), subject
to the rational expectations condition ΘˇP = ΘP and out-of-equilibrium beliefs that
prevent deviations to contracts other than C∅ and CP .
Proposition 4. Suppose only Condition D is satisfied. Pooling equilibria exist.
Depending on the model specifications, there can be an equilibrium in which all
buyer types are active and make the same offer (ΘP = Θ). Such an uninformative
equilibrium can only exist when the average common value, E(θx), is so low as to
permit a sufficiently low pooling price. Otherwise, low-valued buyer types prefer
not to trade (ΘP ⊂ Θ), so that the buyer’s decision (not) to trade partially reveals
the type. In general, there also can be partially revealing equilibria in which active
buyer types are partitioned into several subsets each offering a different pooling
contract.
As is common in signaling games, fully revealing and pooling equilibria coexist,
though pooling outcomes can be eliminated by applying the intuitive criterion.
Proposition 5. Only fully revealing equilibria survive the intuitive criterion.
26Despite a slight abuse of terminology, we use the term pooling equilibria also for equilibria
in which some types actually choose to be passive and do not trade in equilibrium, while the
other types make a uniform offer.
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In any equilibrium in which some buyer types pool on the same offer, some
types pay more, and others less, than their respective common values. As it turns
out, a deviating offer with a lower price and smaller quantity that is attractive
only to the overpaying types always exists. Under the intuitive criterion, such
a deviation can be attributed only to these types. Among such off-equilibrium
beliefs, none can sustain pooling outcomes.
Thus, pooling equilibria are not robust to the intuitive criterion unless overpay-
ing types cannot deviate to a lower quantity due to an exogenous constraint. Yet,
imposing a minimum quantity is generally not sufficient. Similar restrictions also
would have to be applied to other signaling devices, such as trading probabilities
or, if feasible, revenue sharing.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis of bilateral trade frictions and their contractual resolution premises
that the buyer is better informed about the seller’s outside option. This outside
option, which we posit in reduced form, could be the seller’s (counterfactual) payoff
either when retaining the good indefinitely or when seeking out alternative buyers
to eventually sell the good. In the latter case, our implicit assumption is that
searching for alternative buyers is costly and that the initial buyer has private
information about the costs and benefits of doing so. A natural microfoundation
for this assumption would be to embed the current model into a search market,
in which participants on one side of the market are informed about each other’s
valuations, whereas participants on the other side of the market know only their
individual valuations. In such a setting, every meeting between potential trading
partners results in a smart buyer problem – since one has private information about
the other’s outside option – the severity of which would depend on the severity of
the search frictions.
It also may be interesting to explore the role of intermediaries when smart
buyer and lemons problems coexist. In practice, laypeople frequently employ ex-
perts as agents to negotiate trades with the other (better informed) side of the
market, often motivated by the fear of otherwise being short-changed. Conversely,
better-informed parties sometimes use “front men” to trade on their behalf to avoid
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suspicion. This use of third parties by both buyers and sellers has possibly interest-
ing implications for market structure, intermediary contracts, and firm boundaries.
These issues, as well as more specific applications of the smart buyer framework,
are left for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
A fully revealing equilibrium is characterized by the following optimization prob-
lem:
max
θˆx∈Θx
q(θˆx)θx + z(q(θˆx); θx)− t0(θˆx),
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (IC)
q(θx)θx + z (q(θx); θx)− t0(θx) ≥ q(θˆx)θx + z(q(θˆx); θx)− t0(θˆx) ∀θˆx ∈ Θx
and the participation constraint (PC)
[1− q(θx)]θx + t0(θx) ≥ θx.
Since the parameter θz is common knowledge, we subsequently omit it.
In our setting, since the conditions of Theorem 3 in Mailath and von Thad-
den (2013) are met, incentive-compatibility implies differentiability of the optimal
contract schedule. Hence, we can adopt the first-order approach without loss of
generality. In doing so, we follow the steps outlined in Baron and Myerson (1982).
Claim. A fully revealing equilibrium schedule {q(.), t0(.)} is characterized by
max
θˆx∈Θx
q(θˆx)θx + z(q(θˆx); θx)− t0(θˆx)
s.t. q′(θx)θx + zqq′(θx)− t′0(θx) = 0 (FOC)
q′(θx) > 0 (M)
[1− q(θx)]θx + t0(θx) ≥ θx (PC)
for all θx ∈ Θx.
Proof. We show that (FOC) and (M) are jointly necessary and sufficient conditions
for (IC).
Necessity. Consider two arbitrary types, θhx and θlx < θhx. Using (IC), the
downstream incentive compatibility constraint, which ensures that type θhx does
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not report θˆx = θlx, is
q(θhx)θ
h
x + z(q(θ
h
x); θ
h
x)− t0(θhx) ≥ q(θlx)θhx + z(q(θlx); θhx)− t0(θlx).
Similarly, the upstream incentive compatibility constraint, which ensures that type
θlx does not report θˆx = θhx, is
q(θlx)θ
l
x + z(q(θ
l
x); θ
l
x)− t0(θlx) ≥ q(θhx)θlx + z(q(θhx); θlx)− t0(θhx).
Isolating t0(θhx)− t0(θlx) on one side in each of the two constraints, we can combine
them into
[q(θhx)− q(θlx)]θhx + z(q(θhx); θhx)− z(q(θlx); θhx) ≥
t0(θ
h
x)− t0(θlx) ≥
[q(θhx)− q(θlx)]θlx + z(q(θhx); θlx)− z(q(θlx); θlx). (17)
This implies
[q(θhx)− q(θlx)]θhx + z(q(θhx); θhx)− z(q(θlx); θhx) ≥
[q(θhx)− q(θlx)]θlx + z(q(θhx); θlx)− z(q(θlx); θlx),
which can only hold if q(θhx) > q(θlx). For q(θhx) < q(θlx), [q(θhx) − q(θlx)]θhx <
[q(θhx) − q(θlx)]θlx and z(q(θhx); θhx) − z(q(θlx); θhx) ≤ z(q(θhx); θlx) − z(q(θlx); θlx) since
zxθx ≥ 0 by Assumption 1, so (17) would be violated. For q(θhx) = q(θlx), both types
would prefer the offer with the smaller transfer. Dividing (17) and q(θhx) > q(θlx)
each by
(
θhx − θlx
)
and taking the limit
(
θhx − θlx
)→ 0 implies, respectively, (FOC)
and (M).
Sufficiency. Differentiating the objective function with respect to the choice
variable θˆx yields
q′(θˆx)θx + zq(q′(θˆx), θx)q′(θˆx)− t′0(θˆx).
Using t′0(θˆx) = q′(θˆx)θˆx + zqq′(θˆx) from (FOC), the derivative becomes
q′(θˆx)[θx − θˆx + z(q(θˆx); θx)− z(q(θˆx); θˆx)].
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By (M), q′(θˆx) > 0. Then, since zxθx ≥ 0 by Assumption 1, the derivative is
positive for all θˆx ≤ θx and negative for all θˆx ≥ θx. In other words, given (FOC)
and (M), the objective function is quasiconcave in θˆx. This, in turn, implies that
the maximum is fully identified by the local optimality conditions, that is, (FOC)
and (M) are sufficient for (IC).
Claim. A schedule {q(.), t0(.)} exists that satisfies (FOC), (M), and (PC) for all
θx ∈ Θx.
Proof. Rewrite (PC) as
q(θx)θx = t0(θx) + rS(θx),
where rS(.) ≥ 0 is a “seller’s rent” function. Restricting attention to differentiable
contract schedules, we differentiate both sides with respect to θx, which yields
q′(θx)θx + q(θx) = t′0(θx) + r
′
S(θx).
Using t′0(θx) = q′(θx)θx + zxq′(θx) from the (FOC) and rearranging yields
q′(θx) =
q(θx)− r′S(θx)
zq(q(θx); θx)
. (18)
To construct a fully revealing equilibrium schedule, the seller’s marginal rent func-
tion r′S(.) has to be chosen such that the right-hand side of (18) is strictly positive
for all θx so as to also satisfy (M). Across (buyer types with) strictly positive
trades, this can be made to hold for r(.) = 0, which leads to the LCS equilibrium
defined by (5). Rent functions exist with r(θx) > 0 for some θx that also satisfy
(M), in which case the seller earns a strictly positive rent from some buyer types
in equilibrium.
In regard to existence, (18) is a differential equation of the form
∂q
∂θx
= F (q, θx).
The boundary condition that the highest type trades all the asset defines an initial
value (q0, θ0x) = (1, θx). Since z is twice continuously differentiable, F (q, θx) is
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continuously differentiable in (q, θx) ∈ [0, 1]× [θx, θx]. So a unique solution exists
to the initial value problem defined by (18) and (q0, θ0x) = (1, θx) (cf. Sydsaeter et
al. 2008, 217).
We conclude the proof by describing how the buyer’s payoff varies with her
type: by the envelope theorem, the equilibrium payoff V∗ satisfies
∂V∗
∂θx
= q(θx) + zθx(q(θx); θ).
Since the highest type, θ¯x, earns its full information payoff, z(1; θ¯x), we have
V∗(θx) = z(1; θ¯x)−
ˆ θ¯x
θx
q(u) + zθx(q(u);u)du.
Since q(θx)+zθx(q(θx), θx) > 0, the buyer’s equilibrium payoff is strictly increasing
in θx. Furthermore, there may be model specifications in which buyer types below
a unique threshold do not trade, in which case the equilibrium is semiseparating:
not all types trade, but all types with strictly positive trades are fully revealed. 
Proof of Proposition 2
A fully revealing equilibrium schedule is characterized by the following optimiza-
tion problem:
max
θˆx∈Θx
α(θˆx)[θx + z (1; θx)]− t0(θˆx),
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (IC)
α(θx)[θx + z (1; θx)]− t0(θx) ≥ α(θˆx)[θx + z (1; θx)]− t0(θˆx) ∀θˆx ∈ Θx
and the participation constraint (PC)
t0(θx) + [1− α(θx)] [θx + z(1; θx)] ≥ θx.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, we omit θz and use the first-order approach.
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Claim. A fully revealing equilibrium schedule {α(.), t0(.)} is characterized by
max
θˆx∈Θx
α(θˆx)[θx + z (1; θx)]− t0(θˆx)
s.t. α′(θx)[θx + z (1; θx)]− t′0(θx) = 0 (FOC)
α′(θx) > 0 (M)
t0(θx) + [1− α(θx)] [θx + z(1; θx)] ≥ θx (PC)
for all θx ∈ Θx.
Proof. We must show that (FOC) and (M) are a necessary and sufficient condition
for (IC).
Necessity. Consider two arbitrary buyer types, θhx and θlx < θhx. By (IC), the
downstream incentive compatibility constraint is
α(θhx)[θ
h
x + z
(
1; θhx
)
]− t0(θhx) ≥ α(θlx)[θhx + z
(
1; θhx
)
]− t0(θlx).
Similarly, the upstream incentive compatibility constraint is
α(θlx)[θ
l
x + z
(
1; θlx
)
]− t0(θlx) ≥ α(θhx)[θlx + z
(
1; θlx
)
]− t0(θhx).
Rearranging these constraints to
[α(θhx)− α(θlx)][θhx + z
(
1; θhx
)
] ≥ t0(θhx)− t0(θlx)
t0(θ
h
x)− t0(θlx) ≥ [α(θhx)− α(θlx)][θlx + z
(
1; θlx
)
]
implies
[α(θhx)− α(θlx)][θhx + z
(
1; θhx
)
] ≥ [α(θhx)− α(θlx)][θlx + z
(
1; θlx
)
], (19)
which can only hold if α(θhx) > α(θlx). For α(θhx) < α(θlx), (19) would be violated
because θhx + z
(
1; θhx
)
> θlx + z
(
1; θlx
)
, which follows from zθx > 0 (Assumption
1). For α(θhx) = α(θlx), both types would prefer the offer with the smaller fixed
transfer. Dividing (19) and α(θhx) > α(θlx) each by
(
θhx − θlx
)
and taking the limit(
θhx − θlx
)→ 0 implies, respectively, (FOC) and (M).
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Sufficiency. Consider the first derivative of the objective function with respect
to the choice variable θˆx:
α′(θˆx)[θx + z (1; θx)]− t′0(θˆx).
Using t′0(θˆx) = α′(θˆx)[θˆx + z(1; θˆx)] from (FOC), the derivative becomes
α′(θˆx)[θx − θˆx + z(1; θx)− z(1; θˆx)].
By (M), α′(θˆx) > 0, and since zθx > 0 (Assumption 1), the derivative is positive
for all θˆx ≤ θx and negative for all θˆx ≥ θx. In other words, given (FOC) and
(M), the objective function is quasi concave in θˆx. This, in turn, implies that the
maximum is fully identified by the local optimality conditions.
Claim. A schedule {α(.), t0(.)} exists that satisfies (FOC), (M), and (PC) for all
θx ∈ Θx.
Proof. Rewrite (PC) as
t0(θx) + [1− α(θx)] [θx + z(1; θx)] = θx + rS(θx),
where rS(.) ≥ 0. Rearranging and differentiating on both sides with respect to θx
yields
t′0(θx) = α
′(θx)θx + α(θx) + α′(θx)z(1; θx)− [1− α(θx)]zθx(1; θx) + r′S(θx).
Using t′0(θx) = α′(θx)[θx + z (1; θx)] from the (FOC) and rearranging yields
α(θx) =
zθx(1; θx)− r′S(θx)
1 + zθx(1; θx)
. (20)
To construct a fully revealing equilibrium schedule, the seller’s marginal rent func-
tion r′S(.) has to be chosen such that the right-hand side of (20) is strictly increasing
in θx so as to also satisfy (M). Differentiating (20) with respect to θx yields
α′(θx) =
zθxθx(1; θx)− r′′S(θx)[1 + zθx(1; θx)] + r′S(θx)zθxθx(1; θx)
[1 + zθx(1; θx)]
2
. (21)
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Two cases exist: First, if zθxθx(1; θx) > 0 for all θx ∈ Θx, we can set rS(.) = 0 such
that (PC) is binding for every type. This yields the LCS equilibrium defined by
(11) in the proposition. Second, if zθxθx(1; θx) ≤ 0 for some θx ∈ Θx, there exists
no incentive-compatible schedule under which (PC) binds for every type. Instead,
the seller’s rent function rS(.) must be strictly positive for some θx ∈ Θx, and must
be chosen such that (21) is strictly positive for all θx ∈ Θx. The latter requirement
implies that rS(.) is strictly decreasing in θx over some interval in Θx.
By the envelope theorem, the buyer’s equilibrium payoff V∗ satisfies
∂V∗
∂θx
= α(θx)[1 + zθx (1; θx)].
Since the highest type, θ¯x, earns its full information payoff, z(1; θ¯x), we have
V∗(θx) = z(1; θ¯x)−
ˆ θ¯x
θx
α(u)[1 + zθx (1;u)]du.
Since α(θx)[1 + zθx (1; θx)] > 0, the buyer’s equilibrium payoff is strictly increasing
in θx. Again, there may be model specifications in which buyer types below some
unique threshold do not trade. 
Proof of Proposition 3
A buyer of type θx receives the payoff z(1; θx, θz) when making a truthful offer
with the fixed transfer θx. Now consider the buyer’s payoff when mimicking a
lower-valued type θ′x < θx. By Assumption 1, v(1; θ′x, θz) < v(1; θx, θz). Hence,
when mimicking type θ′x, type θx would incur a penalty τ > θx− θ′x and its payoff
would be less than z(1; θx, θz). Now consider the payoff from mimicking any type
θ′′x > θx. By Assumption 1, v(1; θ′′x, θz) > v(1; θx, θz). Hence, mimicking would not
trigger a penalty, but type θx would pay a fixed transfer of θ′′x, which is higher than
the fixed transfer θx under its truthful offer. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
We establish the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which all active buyer types
offer the same contract (qP , tP ). We first consider, in turn, the buyer’s and the
seller’s participation constraints, then use a fixed point argument, and conclude
with specifying the necessary off-equilibrium beliefs.
Buyer’s participation constraint. For a given transfer tP , the buyer types that
prefer to be active are defined by the buyer’s participation constraint
qP θx + z(qP ; θx)− tP ≥ 0.
Since zθx > 0, the left-hand side is strictly increasing in θx. Thus, unique cutoff
type θcx = f(tP ) exists, defined by
qP θ
c
x + z(qP ; θ
c
x)− tP = 0
such that all and only types θx ≥ θcx make the offer. Note that f(.) is continuous
and increasing and satisfies f(qP θx) = θx, and f(qP θx) < θx, where qP θx is the
(smallest) price the seller would accept regardless of her beliefs about the common
value.
Seller’s participation constraint. For a given cutoff type, the seller accepts a
given offer (qP , tP ) if her participation constraint holds:
tP ≥
ˆ θx
θcx
h(u)
1−H(θcx)
qPudu ≡ g(θcx).
This inequality defines a set of acceptable prices. We focus on the lowest acceptable
price g(θcx). Note that g(.) is continuous and increasing and satisfies g(θx) =
qPE(θx) > qP θx, and g(θx) = qP θx.
Fixed point. It follows directly from the properties of f(.) and g(.) that they
intersect at least once in Θx. That is, there exists a fixed point at which f(g(θcx)) =
θcx, which defines an equilibrium offer: qP and tP = g(θcx) ≤ qP θx.
Off-equilibrium beliefs. To support (qP , g(θcx)) as a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium, assume that the seller assigns any offer other than (qP , g(θcx)) to the highest
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type. Given these beliefs, even the highest type does not want to deviate if
z(1; θx) ≤ qP θx + z(qP ; θx)− tP .
This imposes a restriction on qP but always holds, for example, for qP = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5
In any equilibrium other than the fully revealing one, there is a subset ΘP with at
least two types that choose the same contract CP = (qP , qPPP , 0), where PP is the
per-unit price. The seller’s participation constraint requires PP ≥ E
(
θx
∣∣θx ∈ ΘP ).
Denote the lowest type in this subset by θP ≡ min ΘP . Clearly, PP > θP .
Consider the contract Cd = (qd, qdP d, 0), with qd = qP − δ. A given type θx
prefers Cd over CP if and only if
qPPP − qdP d > v(qP ; θx, θz)− v(qd; θx, θz).
Since the right-hand side of the inequality increases in θx (Assumption 1), if the
inequality holds for some type θx, then it also holds for all lower types. Hence, we
can adjust P d such that the inequality holds only for θx ≤ θP . For very small δ,
this requires a small change in the price such that P d remains above θP . Under
the intuitive criterion, the seller assigns the deviation Cd to types θx ≤ θP . Hence,
given P d ≥ θP , the seller never rejects the contract. Thus, only fully revealing
equilibria survive the intuitive criterion. 
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